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My Mission to London, 1912-14
by Prince
Lichnowsky
My Appointment
In September, 1912, Baron Marschall died after he had only been at his
post in London for a few months. His appointment,
which no doubt was principally due to his age and the desire of his
junior officer to go to London, was one of the many
mistakes of our policy.
In spite of his striking personality and great reputation, he was too
old and too tired to adjust himself to the Anglo-Saxon
world, which was completely alien to him; he was rather an official
and a lawyer than a diplomat and statesman. From the
very beginning he was at great pains to convince the English of the
harmlessness of our fleet, and naturally this only produced
the contrary effect.
Much to my surprise, I was offered the post in October. I had retired
to the country as a "Personalreferent" after many years
of activity, there being then no suitable post available for me. I
passed my time between flax and turnips, among horses and
meadows, read extensively, and occasionally published political essays.
Thus I had spent eight years, and it was thirteen since I had left the
Embassy at Vienna with the rank of Envoy. That had been
my last real sphere of political activity, as in those days such activity
was impossible unless one was prepared to help a
half-crazy chief in drafting his crotchety orders with their crabbed
instructions.
I do not know who was responsible for my being appointed to London.
It was certainly not due to H.M.alone. I was not one
of his intimates, though he was at all times gracious to me. I also
know by experience that his nominees generally met with
successful opposition. Herr von Kiderlen had really wanted to send
Herr von Stumm to London! He immediately manifested
unmistakable ill-will towards me, and endeavoured to intimidate me
by his incivility. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was at
that time kindly disposed towards me, and had paid me a visit at Gratz
only a short time before. I am therefore inclined to
think that they all agreed on me because no other candidate as available
at the moment. But for Baron Marschall's unexpected
death, I should no more have been called out of retirement then than
at any other time during all those previous years.
Morocco Policy
It was certainly the right moment for a new effort to establish better
relations with England. Our enigmatic Morocco policy
had repeatedly shaken confidence in our pacific intentions. At the
very least, it had given rise to the suspicion that we did not
quite know what we wanted, or that it was our object to keep Europe
on the qui vive, and, when opportunity offered, to
humiliate France. An Austrian colleague, who had been in Paris for
a long time, said to me: "Whenever the French begin to
forget about revanche, you always remind them of it with a jack-boot."
After we had repulsed M. Delcasse's efforts to arrive at an understanding
with us about Morocco, and prior to that had
formally declared that we had no political interests there which conformed
to the traditions of the Bismarckian policy we
suddenly discovered a second Kruger in Abdul Aziz. We assured him also,
like the Boers, of the protection of the mighty
German Empire, with the same display and the same result; both demonstrations
terminated with our retreat, as they were
bound to do, if we had not already made up our minds to embark on the
world-war. The distressing congress at Algeciras
could not change this in any way, still less the fall of M. Delcasse.
Our attitude promoted the Russo-Japanese and later the Anglo- Japanese
rapprochement.. In face of "the German Peril" all
other differences faded into the background. The possibility of a new
Franco-German war had become apparent, and such a
war could not, as in 1870, leave either Russia or England unaffected.
The uselessness of the Triple Alliance had been shown at Algeciras,
while that of the agreements arrived at there was
demonstrated shortly afterwards by the collapse of the Sultanate, which,
of course, could not be prevented. Among the
German people, however, the belief gained ground that our foreign policy
was feeble and was giving way before the
"Encirclement" that high-sounding phrases were succeeded by pusillanimous
surrender.
It is to the credit of Herr von Kiderlen, who is otherwise overrated
as a statesman, that he wound up our Moroccan
inheritance and accepted as they were the facts that could no longer
be altered. Whether, indeed, it was necessary to alarm
the world by the Agadir incident I will leave others to say. It was
jubilantly acclaimed in Germany, but it had caused all the
more disquiet in England because the Government were kept waiting for
three weeks for an explanation of our intentions.
Lloyd George's speech, which was meant as a warning to us, was the
consequence. Before Delcasse's fall, and before
Algeciras, we might have had a harbour and territory on the West Coast,
but after those events it was impossible.
Sir Edward Grey's Programme
When I came to London in November, 1912, the excitement over Morocco
had subsided, as an agreement with France had
been reached in Berlin. It is true that Haldane's mission had failed,
as we had required the assurance of neutrality, instead of
being content with a treaty securing us against British attacks and
attacks with British support. Yet Sir Edward Grey had not
relinquished the idea of arriving at an agreement with us, and in the
first place tried to do this in colonial and economic
questions. Conversations were in progress with the capable and business-like
Envoy von Kuhlmann concerning the renewal
of the Portuguese colonial agreement and Mesopotamia (Bagdad Railway),
the unavowed object of which was to divide both
the colonies and Asia Minor into spheres of influence.
The British statesman, after having settled all outstanding points of
difference with France and Russia, wished to make
similar agreements with us. It was not his object to isolate us, but
to the best of his power to make us partners in the existing
association. As he had succeeded in overcoming Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian
differences, so he also wished to do his
best to eliminate the Anglo-German, and by a network of treaties, which
would in the end no doubt have led to an agreement
about the troublesome question of naval armaments, to ensure the peace
of the world, after our previous policy had led to an
association the Entente which represented a mutual insurance against
the risk of war.
This was Sir E. Grey's plan. In his own words: Without interfering with
our existing friendship with France and Russia,
which has no aggressive aims and does not entail any binding obligations
on England, to arrive at a friendly rapprochement
and understanding with Germany, "to bring the two groups nearer."
As with us, there were two parties in England at that time the Optimists,
who believed in an understanding, and the
Pessimists, who thought that sooner or later war was inevitable. The
former embraced Messrs. Asquith, Grey, Lord Haldane,
and most of the Ministers in the Radical Cabinet; also the leading
Liberal papers, such as the Westminster Gazette,
Manchester Guardian, Daily Chronicle. The Pessimists were mainly Conservative
politicians like Mr. Balfour, who
repeatedly made this clear to me; also leading Army men, like Lord
Roberts, who pointed out the necessity of universal
military service ("The Writing on the Wall"); further, the Northcliffe
Press and the eminent English journalist Mr. Garvin, of
The Observer. During my period of office, however, they abstained from
all attacks, and maintained both personally and
politically a friendly attitude. But our naval policy and our attitude
in 1905, 1908, and 1911 had aroused in them the
conviction that after all it would some day come to war. Just as it
is with us, the former are now being accused in England of
short-sightedness and simplicity, whereas the latter are looked on
as the true prophets.
The Albanian Question
The first Balkan War had led to the collapse of Turkey and thus to a
defeat for our policy, which had been identified with
Turkey for a number of years. Since Turkey in Europe could no longer
be saved, there were two ways in which we could
deal with the inheritance: either we could declare our complete disinterestedness
with regard to the frontier delimitations
and leave the Balkan Powers to settle them, or we could support our
"Allies" and carry on a Triple Alliance policy in the
Near East, thus giving up the role of mediator.
From the very beginning I advocated the former course, but the Foreign
Office emphatically favoured the latter.
The vital point was the Albanian question. Our Allies desired the establishment
of an independent Albanian state, as the
Austrians did not want the Serbs to obtain access to the Adriatic,
and the Italians did not want the Greeks to get to Valona or
even to the north of Corfu. As opposed to this, Russia, as is known,
was backing Serbia's wishes and France those of Greece.
My advice was to treat this question as outside the scope of the Alliance,
and to support neither the Austrian nor the Italian
claims. Without our aid it would have been impossible to set up an
independent Albania, which, as anyone could foresee,
had no prospect of surviving; Serbia would have extended to the sea,
and the present world-war would have been avoided.
France and Italy would have quarrelled over Greece, and if the Italians
had not wanted to fight France unaided they would
have been compelled to acquiesce in Greece's expansion to the north
of Durazzo. The greater part of Albania is Hellenic.
The towns in the south are entirely so; and during the Conference of
Ambassadors delegations from principal towns arrived
in London to obtain annexation to Greece. Even in present-day Greece
there are Albanian elements and the so-called Greek
national dress is of Albanian origin. The inclusion of the Albanians,
who are principally Orthodox and Moslem, in the body
of the Greek state was therefore the best and most natural solution,
if you left Scutari and the north to the Serbs and
Montenegrins. For dynastic reasons H.M. was also in favour of this
solution. When I supported this view in a letter to the
monarch I received agitated reproaches from the Chancellor; he said
that I had the reputation of being "an opponent of
Austria," and I was to abstain from such interference and direct correspondence.
The Near East and the Policy of the Triple Alliance
We ought at last to have broken with the fatal tradition of pursuing
a Triple Alliance policy in the Near East also, and have
recognised our mistake, which lay in identifying ourselves in the south
with the Turks and in the north with the
Austro-Magyars. For the continuance of this policy, upon which we had
entered at the Berlin Congress, and which we had
actively pursued ever since was bound to lead in time to a conflict
with Russia and, to the world-war, more especially if the
requisite cleverness were lacking in high places. Instead of coming
to terms with Russia on a basis of the independence of
the Sultan, whom even Petrograd did not wish to eject from Constantinople,
and of confining ourselves to our economic
interests in the Near East and to the partitioning of Asia Minor into
spheres of influence while renouncing any intention of
military or political interference, it was our political ambition to
dominate on the Bosphorus. In Russia they began to think
that the road to Constantinople and the Mediterranean lay via Berlin.
Instead of supporting the active development of the
Balkan States which, once liberated, are anything rather than Russian,
and with which our experiences had been very
satisfactory we took sides with the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.
The fatal mistake of our Triple Alliance and Near East policy which
had forced Russia, our natural best friend and
neighbour, into the arms of France and England and away from its policy
of Asiatic expansion was the more apparent, as a
Franco-Russian attack, which was the sole hypothesis that justified
a Triple Alliance policy, could be left out of our
calculations.
The value of the Italian alliance needs no further reference. Italy
will want our money and our tourists even after the war,
with or without an alliance. That this latter would fail us in case
of war was patent beforehand. Hence the alliance had no
value. Austria needs protection in war, as in peace, and has no other
support. Her dependence on us is based on political,
national, and economic considerations, and is the greater the more
intimate our relations with Russia are. The Bosnian crisis
taught us this. Since the days of Count Beust no Vienna Minister has
adopted such a self- confidant attitude towards us as
Count Aehrenthal during the later years of his life. If German policy
is conducted on right lines, cultivating relations with
Russia, Austria-Hungary is our vassal and dependent on us, even without
an alliance or recompense; if it is wrongly
conducted, then we are dependent on Austria. Hence there was no reason
for the alliance.
I knew Austria too well not to be aware that a return the policy of
Prince Felix Schwarzenberg or Count Moritz Esterhazy
was inconceivable there. Little as the Slavs there love us, just as
little do they wish to return to a German Empire even with a
Habsburg-Lorraine emperor at its head. They are striving for a federation
in Austria on national lines, a state of things which
would have even less chance of being realised within the German Empire
than under the Double Eagle. The Germans of
Austria, however, acknowledge Berlin as the centre of German Might
and Culture, and are well aware that Austria can never
again be the leading Power. They wish for as intimate a connection
with the German Empire as possible, not for an
anti-German policy.
Since the 'seventies the position has fundamentally changed in Austria,
as in Bavaria. As, in the latter, a return to Great
German separatism and old Bavarian policy is not to be feared, so with
the former a resuscitation of the policy of Prince
Kaunitz and Schwarzenberg was not to be expected. By a federation with
Austria, however, which resembles a big Belgium,
since its population, even without Galicia and Dalmatia, is only about
half Germanic, our interests would suffer as much as if
we subordinated our policy to the views of Vienna or Budapest thus
espousing Austria's quarrels ("d'epouser tes querelles
d'Autriche").
Hence we were not obliged to take any notice of the desires of our ally;
they were not only unnecessary but also dangerous,
as they would lead to a conflict with Russia if we looked at Oriental
questions through Austrian spectacles.
The development of the alliance, from a union formed on a single hypothesis
for a single specific purpose, into a general and
unlimited association, a pooling of interests in all spheres, was the
best way of producing that which diplomacy was
designed to prevent war. Such an "alliance policy" was also calculated
to alienate from us the sympathies of the strong,
young, rising communities in the Balkans, who were prepared to turn
to us and to open their markets to us.
The difference between the power of a Ruling House and a National State,
between dynastic and democratic ideas of
government, had to be decided, and as usual we were on the wrong side.
King Carol told one of our representatives that he had entered into
the alliance with us on the assumption that we retained the
leadership; but if this passed to Austria, that would alter the foundations
of the relationship, and under such circumstances he
would not be able to go on with it.
Things were similar in Serbia, where, contrary to our own economic interests,
we were supporting the Austrian policy of
strangulation.
Every time we have backed the wrong horse, whose breakdown could have
been foreseen: Kruger, Abdul Aziz, Abdul
Hamid, Wilhelm of Wied, ending the most fatal of all mistakes with
the great plunge on the Berchtold stable.
The Conference of Ambassadors
Shortly after my arrival in London, at the end of 1912, Sir E. Grey
proposed an informal conversation to prevent the Balkan
War developing into a European one, after we had unfortunately refused,
on the outbreak of the war, to agree to the French
proposal of a declaration of disinterestedness. The British statesman
from the very beginning took up the position that
England had no interest in Albania, and had no intention of going to
war over this question He merely wished to mediate
between the two groups as an "honest broker" and smooth over difficulties.
He therefore by no means took sides with the
Entente, and during the eight months or so of the negotiations his
goodwill and his authoritative influence contributed in no
small degree to the attainment of an agreement. We, instead of adopting
an attitude similar to the English one, invariably took
up the position which was prescribed for us by Vienna. Count Mensdorff
was the leader of the Triple Alliance n London; I
was his "second." It was my duty to "support his proposals. That clever
and experienced man Count Szegyenyi was
conducting affairs in Berlin. His refrain was "Then the casus foederis
will arise," and when I once ventured to doubt the truth
of this conclusion I was severely reprimanded for "Austrophobia." It
was also said that I had an "hereditary weakness" the
allusion being to my father.
On all questions we took sides with Austria and Italy about Albania,
a Serbian port on the Adriatic, Scutari, and also about
the delimitation of the frontiers of Albania while Sir E. Grey hardly
ever supported the French or Russian claims. He mostly
supported our group in order not to give a pretext like the one a dead
Archduke was to furnish later on. Thus with his
assistance it was possible to coax King Nikita out of Scutari again.
Otherwise this question would already have led to a
world-war, as we should certainly not have ventured to induce "our
ally" to give way.
Sir E. Grey conducted the negotiations with circumspection; calm, and
tact. When a question threatened to become involved,
he sketched a formula for agreement which was to the point and was
always accepted. His personality inspired equal
confidence in all the participants.
As a matter of fact we had again successfully emerged from one of those
trials of strength which characterise our policy.
Russia had been obliged to give way to us on all points, as she was
never in a position to procure success for the Serbian
aims. Albania was established as a vassal state of Austria and Serbia
was pressed back from the sea. Hence this conference
resulted in a fresh humiliation for Russian self-esteem. As in 1878
and in 1908, we had opposed the Russian plans although
no German interests were involved. Bismarck was clever enough to mitigate
the mistake of the Congress by the secret treaty
and by his attitude in the Battenberg question; but we continued to
pursue in London the dangerous path, upon which we had
once more entered in the Bosnian question, nor did we leave it in time
when it led to the precipice.
The ill-humour which prevailed in Russia at that time was shown during
the conference by attacks in the Russian Press
against my Russian colleague and Russian diplomacy. The dissatisfied
circles made capital of his German descent and
Roman Catholicism, his reputation as a friend of Germany, and the accident
that he was related both to Count Mensdorff and
to me. Without possessing a very distinguished personality, Count Benckendorff
is endowed with a number of qualifications
that distinguish a good diplomat tact, polished manners, experience,
courtesy, and a natural eye for men and matters. He was
always at pains to avoid a brusque attitude, and was supported in this
by England and France.
Later I once remarked to him: "I presume that Russian feeling is very
anti-German." He replied: "There are also very strong
and influential pro- German circles, but in general people are anti-Austrian."
It is hardly necessary to add that our "Austrophilie … outrance" (friendship
for Austria through thick and thin) was hardly
calculated to loosen the Entente and to direct Russia towards her Asiatic
interests!
The Balkan Conference
At the same time the Balkan Conference was sitting in London and I had
occasion to come into contact with the leaders of the
Balkan States. M. Venizelos was certainly the most distinguished personality.
At that time he was anything rather than
anti-German, and visited me several times; he was especially fond of
wearing the ribbon of the Order of the Red Eagle he
even wore it at the French Embassy. His prepossessing charm and ways
of a man of the world secured him much sympathy.
Next to him M. Daneff, at that time Bulgarian Premier and confidant
of Count Berchtold, played a great part. He gave the
impression of a subtle and energetic man, and it is probably only due
to the influence of his Vienna and Budapest friends, of
whose homage he often made fun, that he was induced to commit the folly
of entering upon the second Balkan War and of
refusing Russian arbitration.
M. Take Jonescu was also frequently in London an then visited me regularly.
I knew him from the time when I was Secretary
at Bucharest. He was also one of Herr von Kiderlen's friends. In London
he was endeavouring to obtain concessions to
Rumania from M. Daneff by means of negotiations, in which he was assisted
by the very able Rumanian Ambassador Misu. It
is known that Bulgarian opposition brought about the failure of these
negotiations. Count Berchtold (and we of course with
him) was entirely on Bulgaria's side otherwise by putting pressure
on M. Daneff we might have secured the desired
satisfaction for Rumania and placed her under an obligation to us;
she was finally estranged from the Central Powers by
Austria's attitude during and after the second Balkan War.
The Second Balkan War
The defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War and the victory of Serbia,
with the Rumanian invasion, naturally constituted
a humiliation for Austria. The plan to rectify this by an expedition
against Serbia seems to have been evolved in Vienna soon
after. The Italian revelations prove this, and it may be assumed that
Marquis San Giuliano, who described the plan most aptly
as a pericolosissima aventura, saved us from being involved in a world-war
as early as the summer of 1913.
Owing to the intimacy of Russo-Italian relations, the Vienna plan was
doubtless known in Petrograd. In any case, M.
Sazonow openly declared at Constanza as M. Take Jonescu told me, that
an Austrian attack on Serbia would be a casus belli
for Russia.
When one of my staff returned from leave in Vienna in the spring of
1914 he said that Herr von Tschirschky had declared that
there would soon be war. As I, however, was always left in ignorance
about important events I considered this pessimism to
be unfounded.
As a matter of fact it would appear that, ever since the peace of Bucharest,
Vienna was bent on securing a revision of the
treaty by her own effort and was apparently only waiting for a favourable
pretext. Vienna statesmen could, of course, depend
on our support. They were aware of that, as they had been repeatedly
accused of lack of firmness. In fact, Berlin was
pressing for a "rehabilitation of Austria."
Liman von Sanders
When I returned to London in December, 1913, from a lengthy leave, the
Liman von Sanders question had led to a fresh crisis
in our relations with Russia. Sir E. Grey, not without concern, pointed
out to me the excitement there was in Petrograd over
it: "I have never seen them so excited."
I received instructions from Berlin to request the Minister to exert
a restraining influence in Petrograd, and to assist us in
settling the dispute. Sir Edward gladly did this, and his intervention
contributed in no small degree to smooth the matter over.
My good relations with Sir Edward and his great influence in Petrograd
were repeatedly made use of in similar manner when
we wished to attain anything there, as our representative proved himself
quite useless for such a purpose.
During the fateful days of July, 1914, Sir Edward said to me: "When
you want to obtain anything in Petrograd you always
apply to me, but if I appeal to you for your influence in Vienna you
fail me."
The Colonial Treaty
The good and confidential relations which I had succeeded in establishing,
not only with society and the most influential
people like Sir E. Grey and Mr. Asquith, but also with the great public
at public dinners, produced a marked improvement in
the relations of the two countries. Sir Edward honestly tried to confirm
this rapprochement, and his intentions were most
apparent on two questions the Colonial and the Bagdad Railway Treaties.
In 1898 Count Hatzfeld and Mr. Balfour had signed a secret agreement
dividing the Portuguese colonies into economic
spheres of influence between us and England. As the Government of Portugal
had neither the power nor the means to open up
her extended possessions or to administer them properly, she had already
thought of selling them before and thus relieving
her financial bur dens. An agreement had been come to between us and
England which defined the interests of both parties,
and which was of the greater value because Portugal is entirely dependent
on England, as is generally known.
On the face of it this agreement was to safeguard the integrity and
independence of the Portuguese State, and merely declared
the intention of being of financial and economic assistance to the
Portuguese. Literally, therefore, it did not contravene the
ancient Anglo-Portuguese Alliance of the fifteenth century, which was
last renewed under Charles II and gave a reciprocal
territorial guarantee.
In spite of this, owing to the endeavours of Marquis Soveral, who was
presumably aware of the Anglo-German agreement, a
new treaty the so- called Treaty of Windsor was concluded between England
and Portugal in 1899, confirming the old
agreements, which had always remained in force.
The object of negotiations between us and England, which had commenced
before my arrival, was to amend and improve our
agreement of 1898, as it had proved unsatisfactory on several points
as regards geographical delimitation. Thanks to the
accommodating attitude of the British Government I succeeded in making
the new agreement fully accord with our wishes
and interests. The whole of Angola up to the 20th degree of longitude
was assigned to us, so that we stretched up to the
Congo State from the south; we also acquired the valuable islands of
San Thom‚ and Principe, which are north of the Equator
and therefore really in the French sphere of influence, a fact which
caused my French colleague to enter strong but unavailing
protests.
Further, we obtained the northern part of Mozambique; the Licango formed
the border.
The British Government showed the greatest consideration for our interests
and wishes. Sir E. Grey intended to demonstrate
his goodwill towards us, but he also wished to assist our colonial
development as a whole, as England hoped to divert the
German development of strength from the North Sea and Western Europe
to the Ocean and to Africa. "We don't want to
grudge Germany her colonial development," a member of the Cabinet said
to me.
The British Government originally intended to include the Congo State
in the agreement, which would have given us the right
of pre-emption and enabled us to penetrate it economically. We refused
this offer nominally in view of Belgian
susceptibilities. Perhaps we wished to be economical of successes?
With regard also to the practical realisation of its real
though unexpressed intention the later actual partition of the Portuguese
colonies the treaty in its new form showed marked
improvements and advantages as compared with the old one. Cases had
been specified which empowered us to take steps to
guard our interests in the districts assigned to us. These were couched
in such a manner that it was really left to us to decide
when "vital" interests arose, so that, with Portugal entirely dependent
on England, it was only necessary to cultivate further
good relations with England in order to carry out our joint intentions
at a later date with English assent.
Sir E. Grey showed the sincerity of the British Government's desire
to respect our rights by referring to us Englishmen who
wished to invest capital and asked for the support of the British Government
in the district assigned to us by the new
agreement, even before this was completed and signed, and by informing
them that their enterprise belonged to our sphere of
influence.
The agreement was practically completed at the time of the King's visit
to Berlin in May, 1913. At that time a conference
took place in Berlin under the presidency of the Imperial Chancellor;
in this conference I also took part, and certain further
wishes of ours were defined. On my return to London I succeeded, with
the assistance of Councillor of Legation von
Kuhlmann, who was working at the agreement with Mr. Parker, in having
our last proposals incorporated, so that the whole
agreement could be paragraphed by Sir E. Grey and by m in August, 1913,
before I went on leave.
But now fresh difficulties arose which prevented it being signed, and
I did not obtain the authorisation to' conclude it till a
year later that is, shortly before the outbreak of the war. It was,
however, never signed.
Sir E. Grey was only willing to sign if the agreement were published
together with those of 1898 and 1895. England had, as
he said, no other secret treaties beside these, and it was contrary
to established principles to keep binding agreements secret.
Therefore he could not make any agreement without publishing it. He
was, however, willing to accede to our wishes with
regard to the time and manner of publication, provided that such publication
took place within one year from the date of
signature.
At our Foreign Office, where my London successes had caused increasing
dissatisfaction, and where an influential
personage, who acted the part of Herr von Holstein, wanted the London
post for himself, I was informed that the publication
would endanger our interests in the colonies, as the Portuguese would
then not give us any more concessions.
The futility of this objection is apparent from the consideration that
the Portuguese, in view of the closeness of
Anglo-Portuguese relations, were most probably just as well aware of
the old agreement as of our new arrangements, and
that the influence which England possesses at Lisbon renders their
Government completely impotent in face of an
Anglo-German agreement.
Another pretext had therefore to be found for wrecking the treaty. It
was suggested that the publication of the Treaty of
Windsor, which had been concluded during the time of Prince Hohenlohe
though it was only a renewal of the Treaty of
Charles II., which had always remained in force might endanger the
position of Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, as a proof of
British hypocrisy and perfidy!
I pointed out that the preamble of our agreement expressed the same
thing as the Treaty of Windsor and as other similar
treaties, namely, that we would protect the sovereign rights of Portugal
and the inviolability of its possessions. In vain! In
spite of repeated discussions with Sir E. Grey, at which he made many
fresh suggestions for the publication, the Foreign
Office persisted in its attitude, and finally arranged with Sir E.
Goschen that matters should be left as they were!
The treaty, which offered us extraordinary advantages, the result of
more than a year's work, was thus dropped because it
would have been a public success for me.
When I mentioned the subject to Mr. Harcourt at a dinner at the Embassy
in the spring of 19I4, the Minister for the Colonies
told me that he was placed in a difficult position, and did not know
how to act. The present position was intolerable he
wished to safeguard our interests, but was in doubt whether he should
proceed o the terms of the old or the new treaty. It was
therefor urgently desirable to clear up the situation and to settle
the matter, which had dragged on for such a long time
In reply to a dispatch in this sense I received instructions couched
in terms which showed more emotion than civility, telling
me to abstain from any further interference in the matter.
I now regret that I did not immediately travel to Berlin and place my
post at the disposal of the monarch, and that I had not
lost faith in the possibility of arriving at an understanding with
those in authority, a sinister mistake which was to take its
revenge a few months late in such a tragical way.
However little I even then enjoyed the goodwill of the highest official
of the Empire, as he feared that I was aspiring to his
post, yet I must in justice to him say that during our last interview
before the outbreak of war, at the end of June, 1914, to
which I will refer later, he gave me his assent for the signature and
publication of the treaty. In spite of this it required
repeated applications on my part, which were supported by Herr Dr.
Solf in Berlin, before sanction was finally obtained at
the end of July, 1914. As the Serbian crisis at the time already imperilled
the peace of Europe, the completion of the treaty
had to be postponed. It also is one of the sacrifices of this war.
The Bagdad Treaty
At the same time I was negotiating in London, with the able support
of Herr von Kuhlmann, about the so-called Bagdad
Treaty. The real object of this was to divide up Asia Minor into spheres
of influence, although this term was anxiously
avoided in view of the rights of the Sultan. Sir E. Grey also repeatedly
stated that there were in existence no agreements with
France and Russia about the partition of Asia Minor.
In consultation with a Turkish representative, Hakki Pasha, all economic
questions concerning German undertakings were
settled in the main according to the wishes of the Deutsche Bank. The
most important concession Sir E. Grey made to me
personally was the continuation of the railway as far as Basra. We
had dropped this point in favour of the connection to
Alexandretta; up to that time Bagdad had been the terminal point of
the railway. An international commission was to regulate
navigation on the Shatt-el-Arab. We were also to have a share in the
harbour works at Basra, and received rights for the
navigation of the Tigris, which hitherto had been a monopoly of the
firm of Lynch.
By this treaty the whole of Mesopotamia as far as Basra was included
within our sphere of influence (without prejudice to
already existing British navigation rights on the Tigris and the rights
of the Wilcox irrigation works), as well as the whole
district of the Bagdad and Anatolian railway.
The coast of the Persian Gulf and the Smyrna-Aidin railway were recognised
as the British economic sphere, Syria as the
French, and Armenia as the Russian. If both treaties were executed
and published, an agreement with England would be
reached which would preclude all doubts about the possibility of an
"Anglo-German co-operation."
The Question of the Navy
The Naval question was and is the most delicate of all. It is not always
regarded rightly.
The creation of a powerful fleet on the other side of the North Sea
the development of the greatest military power of the
Continent into the greatest naval power as well was bound to be felt
in England as at least "inconvenient." There can be no
doubt about this in any reasonable view. In order to maintain her advantage
and not to become dependent, in order to secure
the rule over the seas which is necessary for her if she is not to
starve, she was compelled to undertake armaments and
expenditure which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. England's international
position would be threatened, however, if our
policy created the belief that warlike developments might ensue a state
of affairs which had almost been reached during the
time of the Morocco crises and the Bosnian problem.
Great Britain had become reconciled to our fleet within its then appointed
limits, but it was certainly not welcome, and was
one of the causes though not the only cause and perhaps not the most
important of her adhesion to France and Russia; but on
account of the fleet alone England would not have drawn the sword any
more than on account of our trade, which has been
alleged to have produced jealousy and finally war.
From the very beginning I maintained that, notwithstanding the fleet,
it would be possible to arrive at a friendly understanding
and rapprochement if we did not introduce a new Navy Bill and our policy
were indubitably pacific. I also avoided mention
of the fleet and the word never passed between Sir E. Grey and me.
On one occasion Sir E. Grey said at a meeting of the
Cabinet, "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet
to me."
During my tenure of office Mr. Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty,
proposed, as is known, the so called "Naval
holiday" and suggested for financial reasons, and probably also to
meet the pacific wishes of his party, a year's pause in
armaments. Officially Sir E. Grey did not support the proposal; he
never mentioned it to me, but Mr. Churchill repeatedly
spoke to me about it.
I am convinced that his suggestion was honest, as prevarication is altogether
foreign to English nature. It would have been a
great success for Mr. Churchill if he could have come before the country
with reductions of expenditure and freed it from the
nightmare of armaments that weighed on the people.
I replied that for technical reasons it would be difficult to agree
to his plan. What was to become of the workmen who were
engaged for this purpose, and what of the technical staff? Our Naval
programme had been decided on, and it would be
difficult to alter it in any way. On the other hand we had no intention
of exceeding it. But he reverted to it again and pointed
out that the sums used for enormous armaments might better be employed
for other and useful purposes. I replied that this
expenditure too benefited our home industries.
Through interviews with Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir E. Grey's principal private
secretary, I managed to have the question removed
from the agenda without causing any ill feeling, although it was again
referred to in Parliament, and to prevent any official
proposal being made. It was, however, a pet idea of Mr. Churchill's
and the Government's, and I think that by entering upon
his plan and the formula 16:10 for battleships we might have given
tangible proof of our goodwill, and strengthened and
encouraged the tendency (which already prevailed in the Government)
to enter into closer relations with us.
But, as I have said, it was possible to arrive at an understanding in
spite of the fleet and without a "Naval holiday." I had
always regarded my mission from this point of view, and I had also
succeeded in realising my plans when the outbreak of
war destroyed everything I had achieved.
Commercial Jealousy
The "commercial jealousy," about which we hear so much, is based on
a wrong conception of the circumstances. Certainly
Germany's rise as a commercial power after the war of 1870 and during
the following decades was a menace to British
commercial circles which, with their industries and export-houses,
had held a virtual monopoly of trade. The increasing
commerce with Germany, which was the leading country in Europe as regards
British exports a fact to which I invariably
referred in my public speeches had, however, given rise to the wish
to maintain friendly relations with their best customer
and business friend, and had driven all other considerations into the
background.
The Briton is matter-of-fact he takes things as they are and does not
tilt against windmills. Notably in commercial circles I
encountered the most friendly spirit and the endeavour to further our
common economic interests. As a matter of fact nobody
in them took any interest in the Russian, Italian, Austrian, or even
in the French representative, in spite of his striking
personality and his political successes. Only the German and American
Ambassadors attracted public attention.
In order to get into touch with important commercial circles, I accepted
invitations from the United Chambers of Commerce,
and from the London and Bradford Chamber, and was the guest of the
cities of Newcastle and Liverpool. I was well received
everywhere; Manchester, Glasgow. and Edinburgh had also invited me,
and I intended to go there later.
People who did not understand British conditions and did not realise
the importance of "public dinners," also people to
whom my successes were unwelcome, reproached me with having done harm
with my speeches. I believe on the contrary that
by appearing in public and emphasising common commercial interests
I contributed in no small measure to the improvement
of relations, quite apart from the fact that it would have been clumsy
and churlish to refuse all invitations.
In all other circles I also met with the most friendly reception and
hearty co-operation at Court, in society, and from the
Government.
The Court and Society
The King, although not a genius, is a simple and well-meaning man with
sound common sense; he demonstrated his goodwill
towards me and was frankly desirous of furthering my task. Although
the British Constitution leaves only very limited powers
to the Crown, yet the monarch, in virtue of his position, can exercise
a considerable influence on opinion both in society and
in the Government. The Crown is the apex of the social pyramid; it
sets the fashion. Society, which is principally Unionist
(Conservative), has always taken an active interest in politics, a
habit which the ladies share. It is represented in the House
of Lords, the House of Commons, and hence also in the Cabinet. An Englishman
either is a member of society, or he would
like to be one. It is his constant endeavour to be a "Gentleman," and
even people of undistinguished origin, like Mr. Asquith,
delight to mingle in society and the company of beautiful and fashionable
women.
The British gentlemen of both parties have the same education, go to
the same colleges and universities, have the same
recreations golf, cricket, lawn-tennis, or polo. All have played cricket
and football in their youth; they have the same habits
of life, and spend the week-end in the country. There is no social
cleavage between the parties, but only a political one; in
recent years it has so far developed into a social cleavage that the
politicians of the two camps avoid social intercourse with
or another. Even on the neutral territory of an Embassy one did not
venture to mingle the two parties, as since the Veto and
Home Rule Bills the Unionists have ostracised the Radicals. When the
King and Queen dined with us a few months after my
arrival, Lord Londonderry left the house after dinner, as he did not
wish to remain together with Sir E. Grey. It is not a
difference of caste or education as in France; they are not two separate
worlds, but the same world, and the opinion about a
foreigner is a common one, and not without influence on his political
position, whether Mr. Asquith be governing or Lord
Lansdowne.
There has been no difference of caste in England since the time of the
Stuarts, and since the Guelphs and Whig oligarchy, in
contrast to the Tory landed gentry encouraged the rise of an urban
middle-class. It is rather a difference of political opinions
about questions of constitutional law and taxation. Especially aristocrats
like Grey, Churchill, Harcourt, Crewe, who joined
the people's party the Radicals were most hated by the Unionist aristocracy;
one never met any of these gentlemen at any of
the great aristocratic houses, except those of a few party friends.
We were received in London with open arms and both parties rivalled
one another in courtesy towards us. In view of the
close relationship between politics and society in England, it would
be wrong to undervalue social relations, even when the
majority of the upper ten thousand are in opposition to the Government.
There is not the same unbridgable gulf between Mr Asquith and the Duke
of Devonshire that there is between, say, M. Briand
and the Duc de Doudeauville. Certainly they do not consort together
in times of great tension; they belong to two separate
social groups, but these are parts of the same society, though of different
grades, the centre of which is the Court. They have
common friends and habits of life; mostly they have known each other
from their youth up and also are frequently related to
one another either by blood or marriage.
Phenomena like Mr. Lloyd George the man of the people, petty attorney,
and self-made man are the exception. Even Mr.
Burns, the Socialist Labour leader and self-educated man, sought contact
with society. In view of the prevailing attempt to
rank as a gentleman, whose unattained prototype is still the great
aristocrat the value of the verdict of society and its attitude
must not be underestimated.
Hence the social adaptability of a representative nowhere plays a greater
role than in England. A hospitable house with
pleasant hosts is worth more than the most profound scientific knowledge;
a savant with provincial manners and small means
would gain no influence, in spite of all his learning.
The Briton loathes a bore, a schemer, and a prig; he likes a good fellow.
Sir Edward Grey
Sir Edward Grey's influence in all matters of foreign policy was almost
unlimited. On important occasions he used indeed to
say, "I must first bring it before the Cabinet"; but this always agreed
to his views. His authority was undisputed. Although he
does not know foreign countries at all, and had never left England
except for a short visit to Paris, he was fully conversant
with all the important questions owing to his long parliamentary experience
and his natural insight. He understands French,
but does not speak it. He was returned to Parliament as a young man,
and soon began to interest himself in foreign affairs.
Under Lord Rosebery he was Under- Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
and became Secretary of State in 1906, under
Mr. Campbell Bannerman; he has now held the post for some ten years.
The scion of an old north country family, which had already furnished
Grey, the well-known statesman, he joined the left
wing of his party and sympathised with Socialists and pacifists. You
may call him a Socialist in the ideal sense, as he carries
the theory into his private life and lives very simply and unpretentiously,
although he has extensive means. Ostentation is
foreign to him. In London he only had a small house, and never gave
dinners, except the one official dinner at the Foreign
Office on the King's Birthday. On the few occasions when he entertained
guests it was at a simple dinner or lunch with
maidservants to wait. Also he avoided large functions and banquets.
Like his colleagues, he regularly spends his week-ends in the country,
but not with large or fashionable parties. He is mostly
by himself in his cottage in the New Forest, where he takes long walks
to study birds and their ways, as he is a passionate
lover of nature and an ornithologist. Or sometimes he goes to his estate
in the north, where he feeds the squirrels that come in
at the windows, and breeds different species of water fowl.
He was very fond of going to the Norfolk marshes to watch in their breeding
season the rare kinds of herons, which nest only
there.
In his youth he was a well-known cricket and racquet player; now his
favourite pastime is salmon and trout fishing in Scottish
rivers in company with his friend Lord Glenconner, Mr. Asquith's brother-in-law.
"All the rest of the year I am looking
forward to it." He has published a book on fishing.
On one occasion, when we spent a week-end with him alone at Lord Glenconner's,
near Salisbury, he arrived on a bicycle
and returned to his cottage about thirty miles distant in the same
way.
The simplicity and honesty of his ways secured him the esteem even of
his opponents, who were to be found rather in the
sphere of home affairs than of foreign policy. Lies and intrigue are
equally repugnant to him.
His wife, to whom he was devotedly attached and from whom he was inseparable,
died in consequence of being thrown from
a trap she was driving. As is generally known, one of his brothers
was killed by a lion.
Wordsworth is his favourite poet, and he could quote much of his poetry.
The calm quiet of his British nature is not lacking in a sense of humour.
Once when he was lunching with us and the children,
and heard them talking German, he said, "I can't help thinking how
clever these children are to talk German so well," and was
pleased with his joke.
This is a true picture of the man who is decried as "Liar-Grey" and
instigator of the world-war.
Mr. Asquith
Mr. Asquith is a man of an entirely different stamp. A jovial bon- vivant,
fond of the ladies, especially the young and pretty
ones, he is partial to cheerful society and good cooking; and his zest
for enjoyment is shared by his wife. Formerly a
well-known barrister with a large income, and for a number of years
in Parliament, then a Minister under Mr. Gladstone, a
pacifist like his friend Grey, and favouring an understanding with
Germany, he treated all questions with the cheery calm and
assurance of an experienced man of business, whose good health and
excellent nerves were steeled by devotion to the game
of golf.
His daughters were at school in Germany and spoke German fluently. In
a short time we got on friendly terms with him and
his family, and were his guests in his small country house on the Thames.
Only on rare occasions did he concern himself with foreign politics,
when important questions arose; then of course his
decision was final. During the critical day of July, Mrs. Asquith repeatedly
came to us to warn us, and in the end she was
quite distraught at the tragic turn of events. Mr. Asquith also, when
I called on him on the 2nd August to make a last effort in
the direction of expectant neutrality, was quite broken, though absolutely
calm. Tears were coursing down his cheeks.
Nicolson
Sir A. Nicolson and Sir W. Tyrrell were the two most influential men
at the Foreign Office after the Minister. The former
was no friend of ours, but his attitude towards me was absolutely correct
and courteous. Our personal relations were
excellent. He too did not want war; but when we advanced against France,
he no doubt worked in the direction of an
immediate intervention. He was the confidant of my French colleague,
with whom he was in constant touch; also he wished to
relieve Lord Bertie in Paris.
Sir Arthur, who had been Ambassador at Petrograd, had concluded the
treaty of 1907, which had enabled Russia again to
turn her attention to the West and to the Near East.
Tyrrell
Sir W. Tyrrell, Sir Edward's private secretary, possessed far greater
influence than the Permanent Under Secretary. This
highly intelligent man had been at school in Germany, and had then
turned to diplomacy, but had only been abroad for a short
time. At first he favoured the anti-German policy, which was then in
fashion amongst the younger British diplomatists, but
later he became a convinced advocate of an understanding. He influenced
Sir E. Grey, with whom he was very intimate, in
this direction. Since the outbreak of war he has left the Office and
found a place in the Home Office, probably because of the
criticisms passed on him for his Germanophile tendency.
Attitude of the German Foreign Office
Nothing can describe the rage of certain gentlemen at my London successes
and the position which I had managed to make for
myself in a short time. They devised vexatious instructions to render
my office more difficult. I was left in complete
ignorance of the most important matters, and was restricted to the
communication of dull and unimportant reports. Secret
agents' reports on matters about which I could not learn without espionage
and the necessary funds, were never available to
me; and it was not till the last days of July, 1914, that I learnt,
quite by chance, from the Naval Attach‚ of the secret
Anglo-French agreement concerning the co-operation of the two fleets
in case of war. The knowledge of other important
events which had been known to the Office for a long time, like the
correspondence between Grey and Cambon, was kept
from me.
In Case of War
Soon after my arrival I obtained the conviction that under no circumstances
had we to fear a British attack or British support
for any foreign attack, but that under any circumstances England would
protect the French. I expressed this view in repeated
dispatches, with minute proof and great emphasis, but did not obtain
any credence, although Lord Haldane's refusal to assent
to the neutrality formula and England's attitude during the Morocco
crisis had been pretty obvious indications. In addition
there were the secret agreements which I have referred to, and which
were known to the Office.
I always pointed out that in the event of a war between European Powers,
England as a commercial state would suffer
enormously, and would therefore do her best to prevent a conflict;
but, on the other hand, she would never tolerate a
weakening or annihilation of France; because of the necessity of maintaining
the European balance of power and of
preventing a German superiority of force. Lord Haldane had told me
this shortly after my arrival, and all the leading people
had expressed themselves in the same sense.
The Serbian Crisis
At the end of June I went to Kiel by command of the Emperor. A few weeks
prior to this I had been made an honorary D.C.L.
of Oxford, an honour which had not been conferred on any German Ambassador
since Herr von Bunsen. On board the Meteor
we learned of the death of the Archduke. H.M. regretted that his efforts
to win him over to his way of thinking had thus been
rendered vain. I do not know whether the plan of an active policy against
Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt.
As I was not instructed about views and events in Vienna, I did not
attach very great importance to this occurrence. Later on I
could only remark that amongst Austrian aristocrats a feeling of relief
outweighed other sentiments. On board the Meteor
there was also an Austrian guest of the Emperor's, Count Felix Thun.
He had remained in his cabin all the time suffering from
sea sickness, in spite of the splendid weather; but on receiving the
news he was well. The fright or joy had cured him.
On my arrival in Berlin I saw the Chancellor and told him that I considered
the state of our foreign relations very
satisfactory, as we were on better terms with England than we had been
for a long time, whilst in France also the government
was in the hands of a pacifist Ministry.
Herr von Bethmann Hollweg did not appear to share my optimism, and complained
about Russian armaments. I sought to
reassure him, emphasising the fact that Russia had no interest in attacking
us, and that such an attack would never receive
Anglo-French support, as both countries wanted peace. Thereupon I went
to Dr. Zimmermann, who was acting for Herr von
Jagow, and he told me that Russia was about to raise 9000,000 additional
troops. His language betrayed unmistakable
annoyance with Russia, which was "everywhere in our way." There were
also difficulties in economic policy. Of course, I
was not told that General von Moltke was pressing for war; but I learned
that Herr von Tschirschky had been reprimanded
because he reported that he had counselled moderation towards Serbia
in Vienna.
On my return from Silesia to London I stopped only a few hours in Berlin,
where I heard that Austria intended to take steps
against Serbia in order to put an end to an impossible situation.
I regret that at the moment I underestimated the importance of the news.
I thought that nothing would come of it this time
either, and that matters could easily be settled, even if Russia became
threatening. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin
and at once declare that I would not co- operate in a policy of this
kind.
Subsequently I ascertained that, at the decisive conference at Potsdam
on the 5th July, the Vienna enquiry received the
unqualified assent of all the leading people, and with the rider that
no harm would be done if a war with Russia should result.
Thus it was expressed, at any rate, in the Austrian protocol which
Count Mensdorff received in London. Soon afterwards
Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to consult Count Berchtold about all these
matters.
At that time I received instructions to induce the British Press to
adopt a friendly attitude should Austria administer the coup
de grace to the "Great Serbia" movement, and to exert my personal influence
to prevent public opinion from becoming
inimical to Austria. If on remembered England's attitude during the
annexation crisis, when public opinion showed sympathy
for the Serbian rights in Bosnia, as well as her benevolent furtherance
of national movements in the days of Lord Byron and
Garibaldi, the probability that she would support the intended punitive
expedition against the murderers of the prince
happened so remote, that I found myself obliged to give an urgent warning.
But I also warned them against the whole plan,
which I characterised as adventurous and dangerous, and advised them
to counsel the Austrians to moderation, as I did not
believe that the conflict could be localised.
Herr von Jagow replied to me that Russia was not ready; there would
probably be some fuss, but the more firmly we took
sides with Austria the more would Russia give way. As it was, Austria
was accusing us of weakness and therefore we dare
not leave her in the lurch. Public opinion in Russia, on the other
hand, was becoming more and more anti-German, so we
must just risk it.
In view of this attitude, which, as I found later, was based on reports
from Count Pourtales that Russia would not move under
any circumstances, and which caused us to spur Count Berchtold on to
the utmost energy, I hoped for salvation through
British mediation, as I knew that Sir E. Grey's great influence in
Petrograd could be used in the direction of peace. I therefore
availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to request
him in confidence to advise moderation in Russia in case
Austria, as seemed likely, demanded satisfaction from Serbia.
At first the English Press preserved calm and was friendly to Austria,
because the murder was generally condemned. But
gradually more and more voices were heard insisting emphatically that,
however much the crime merited punishment, its
exploitation for political purposes could not be justified. Austria
was strongly exhorted to use moderation.
When the ultimatum was published, all the papers with the exception
of the Standard the ever-necessitous, which had
apparently been bought by Austria were unanimous in condemnation. The
whole world, excepting Berlin and Vienna,
realised that it meant war indeed, "the world-war." The British Fleet,
which happened to have assembled for a naval review,
was not demobilised.
My efforts were in the first place directed towards obtaining as conciliatory
a reply from Serbia as was possible, since the
attitude of the Russian Government left room for no doubts about the
gravity of the situation.
Serbia responded favourably to the British efforts, M. Pasitch had really
agreed to everything, except two points, about
which, however, he declared his willingness to negotiate. If Russia
and England had wanted the war, in order to attack us, a
hint to Belgrade would have been enough, and the unprecedented Note
would not have been answered.
Sir E. Grey went through the Serbian reply with me and pointed out the
conciliatory attitude of the Government of Belgrade.
Thereupon we discussed his proposal of mediation, which was to include
a formula acceptable to both parties for clearing
up the two points. His proposal was that a committee, consisting of
Cambon, the Marquis Imperiali, and myself, should
semble under his presidency, and it would have been easy matter for
us to find an acceptable formula for points at issue,
which mainly concerned the collaboration of Austrian Imperial officials
at the investigations in Belgrade. Given goodwill,
everything could have been settled at one or two sittings, and the
mere acceptance of the British proposal would have brought
about relaxation of the tension, and would have further improved our
relations with England. I therefore strongly backed the
proposal, on the ground that otherwise there was danger of the world-war,
through which we stood to gain nothing and lose
all; but in vain. It was derogatory to the dignity of Austria we did
not intend to interfere in Serbian matters we left these to
our ally. I was to work for "the localisation of the conflict."
Needless to say a mere hint from Berlin would have decided Count Berchtold
to content himself with diplomatic success,
and to accept the Serbian reply. The hint was not given; on the contrary
they urged in the direction of war. It would have been
such a splendid success.
After our refusal Sir Edward requested us to submit a proposal. We insisted
on war. I could not obtain any reply but that
Austria had shown an exceedingly "accommodating spirit" by not demanding
an extension of territory.
Sir Edward rightly pointed out that even without an extension of territory
it is possible to reduce a state to a condition of
vassalage, and that Russia would see a humiliation in this, and would
not suffer it.
The impression grew stronger and stronger that we wanted war under any
circumstances. It was impossible to interpret our
attitude, on a question which did not directly concern us, in any other
way. The urgent requests and definite assurances of M.
Sazonow, followed by the Czar's positively humble telegrams, the repeated
proposals of Sir E. Grey, the warnings o the
Marquis San Giuliano and Signor Bollati, my urgent counsels, all were
of no avail. Berlin persisted; Serbia must be
massacred.
The more I pressed the less were they inclined to come round, if only
that I might not have the success of averting war in
conjunction with Sir Edward Grey.
Finally, on the 29th, the latter decided on the famous warning. I replied
that I had invariably reported that we should have to
reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Repeatedly
the Minister said to me: "If war breaks out, it
will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen."
After that, events followed each other rapidly. When at last Count Berchtold,
who up till then had, at the behest of Berlin,
played the strong man, decided to come round, we replied to the Russian
mobilisation, after Russia had negotiated and
waited for a whole week in vain, with the ultimatum and the declaration
of war.
The English Declaration of War
Sir Edward was still looking for new ways of avoiding the catastrophe.
Sir W. Tyrrell called on me on the morning of the 1st
August to tell me that his chief still hoped to find a way out. Would
we remain neutral if France did? I understood that we
should then agree to spare France, but he had meant that we should
remain altogether neutral towards Russia also. That was
the well-known "misunderstanding." Sir Edward had asked me to call
in the afternoon. As he was at a meeting of the Cabinet,
he called me up on the telephone, Sir W. Tyrrell having hurried to
him at once. In the afternoon however, he talked only about
Belgian neutrality and the possibility that we and France might face
one another in arms without attacking.
Thus this was not a proposal at all, but a question without any guarantee,
as our interview, which I have mentioned before,
was to take place soon afterwards. Berlin, however, without waiting
for the interview, made this report the foundation for
far-reaching measures. Then there came M. Poincare's letter, Bonar
Law's letter, King Albert's telegram. The waverers in the
Cabinet excepting three members who resigned were converted.
Till the very last moment I had hoped that England would adopt a waiting
attitude. Nor did my French colleague feel at all
confident, as I heard from a private source. Even on the 1st August
the King had give the President an evasive reply. But
England was already mentioned as an opponent in the telegram from Berlin
announcing the imminent danger of war. Berlin
was therefore already reckoning on war with England.
Before my departure Sir E. Grey received me, on the 5th, at his house.
I had called at his request. He was deeply moved. He
told me he would always be prepared to mediate. "We don't want to crush
Germany." Unfortunately this confidential
interview was made public, and Herr von Bethmann Hollweg thus destroyed
the last chance of gaining peace through
England.
The arrangements for our departure were perfectly dignified and calm.
The King had previously sent his equerry, Sir E.
Ponsonby, to express his regrets at my departure and that he could
not see me himself. Princess Louise wrote to me that the
whole family were sorry we were leaving. Mrs. Asquith and other friends
came to the Embassy to take leave.
A special train took us to Harwich, where a guard of honour was drawn
up for me. I was treated like a departing Sovereign.
Such was the end of my London mission. It was wrecked, not by the wiles
of the British, but by the wiles of our policy.
Count Mensdorff and his staff had come to the station in London. He
was cheerful, and gave me to understand that perhaps he
would remain there, but he told the English that we, and not Austria,
had wanted the war.
Retrospect
Looking back after two years, I come to the conclusion that I realised
too late that there was no room for me in a system that
for years had lived on routine and traditions alone, and that only
tolerated representatives who reported what their superiors
wished to read. Absence of prejudice and an independent judgment are
resented. Lack of ability and want of character are
praised and esteemed, while successes meet with disfavour and excite
alarm.
I had given up my opposition to the insane Triple Alliance policy, as
I realised that it was useless, and that my warnings
were attributed to "Austrophobia," to my id‚e fixe. In politics, which
are neither acrobatics nor a game, but the main business
of the firm, there is no "phil" or "phobe," but only the interest of
the community. A policy, however, that is based only on
Austrians, Magyars and Turks must come into conflict with Russia, and
finally lead to a catastrophe.
In spite of former mistakes, all might still have be put right in July,
1914. An agreement with England had been arrived at.
We ought to have sent a representative to Petrograd who was at least
of average political capacity, and to have convinced
Russia that we wished neither to control the straits nor to strangle
Serbia. "Lechez l'Autriche et nous lecherons les Français"
("Drop Austria and we will drop the French"), M. Sazonow said to us.
And M. Cambon told Herr von Jagow, "Vous n'avez
pas besoin de suivre l'Autiche partout." ("You need not follow Austria
everywhere").
We wanted neither wars nor alliances; we wanted only treaties that would
safeguard us and others, and secure our economic
development, which was without its like history. If Russia had been
freed in the West, she could again turn to the East, and
the Anglo-Russian rivalry would have been re-established automatically
and without our intervention, and not less certainly
also the Russo-Japanese.
We could also have considered the question of the reduction of armaments,
and need no longer have troubled ourselves about
Austrian complications. Then Austria would have become the vassal of
the German Empire, without any alliance and
especially without our seeking her good graces, a proceeding ultimately
leading to war for the liberation of Poland and the
destruction of Serbia although German interest demanded the exact contrary.
I had to support in London a policy the heresy of which I recognised.
That brought down vengeance on me, because it was a
sin against the Holy Ghost.
My Return
As soon as I arrived in Berlin I saw that I was to be made the scapegoat
for the catastrophe for which our Government had
made itself responsible against my advice and warnings.
The report was deliberately circulated in official quarters that I had
allowed myself to be deceived by Sir E. Grey, because,
if he had not wanted war, Russia would not have mobilised. Count Pourtale,
whose reports could be relied on, was to be
protected, not least on account of his relationship. He had conducted
himself "magnificently," he was praised
enthusiastically, and I was blamed the more severely.
"What does Serbia matter to Russia?" this statesman said to me after
eight years in office at Petrograd. The whole thing was a
British trick that I had not noticed. At the Foreign Office they told
me that war would in any case have come in 1916. Then
Russia would have been ready; therefore it was better now.
The Question of Responsibility
As is evident from all official publications and this is not refuted
by our White Book, which, owing to the poverty of its
contents and to its omissions, is a gravely self accusing document
1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although German interests
were not involved and the danger of a
world-war must have been known to us. Whether we were aware of the
wording of the Ultimatum is completely immaterial.
2. During the time between the 23rd and 30th July, 1914, when M. Sazonow
emphatically declared that he would not tolerate
any attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation,
although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure,
had accepted almost the whole of the Ultimatum, and although an agreement
about the two points at issue could easily have
be reached, and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself
with the Serbian reply.
3. On the 30th July, when Count Berchtold wanted to come to terms, we
sent an ultimatum to Petrograd merely because of the
Russian mobilisation, although Austria had not been attacked; and on
the 31st July we declared war on Russia, although the
Czar pledged his word that he would not order a man to march as long
as negotiations were proceeding thus deliberately
destroying the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
In view of the above undeniable facts it is no wonder that the whole
of the civilised world outside Germany places the entire
responsibility for the world-war upon our shoulders.
The Enemy Point of View
Is it not intelligible that our enemies should declare that they will
not rest before a system is destroyed which is a constant
menace to our neighbours? Must they not otherwise fear that in a few
years' time they will again have to take up arms and
again see their provinces overrun and their towns and villages destroyed?
Have not they proved to be right who declared that
the spirit of Treitschke and Bernhardi governed the German people that
spirit which glorified war as such, and did not loath
it as an evil, that with us the feudal knight and Junker, the warrior
caste, still rule and form ideals and value not the civilian
gentleman; that the love of the duel which animates our academic youth
still persists in those who control the destinies of the
people? Did not the Zaber incident and the parliamentary discussions
about it clearly demonstrate to foreign countries the
value we place on the rights and liberties of the citizen if these
collide with questions of military power?
That intelligent historian Cramb, who has since died, an admirer of
Germany, clothed the German conception in the words of
Euphorion:
Dream ye of peace ?
Dream he that will
War is the rallying cry! Victory is the refrain.
Militarism, which by rights is an education for the people and an instrument
of policy, turns policy into the instrument of
military power when the patriarchal absolutism of the soldier-kingdom
makes possible an attitude which a democracy,
remote from military Junker influence, would never have permitted.
So think our enemies, and so they must think when they see that, in
spite of capitalistic industrialisation and in spite of
socialist organisation, "the living are still ruled by the dead," as
Friedrich Nietzsche says. The principal war aim of our
enemies, the democratisation of Germany, will be realised!
Bismarck
Bismarck, like Napoleon, loved conflict for itself. As a statesman he
avoided fresh wars, the folly of which he recognised.
He was content with bloodless battles. After he had, in rapid succession,
vanquished Christian, Francis Joseph, and
Napoleon, it was the turn of Arnim, Pius, and Augusta. That did not
suffice him. Gortschakow, who thought himself the
greater, had repeatedly annoyed him. The conflict was carried almost
to the point of war even by depriving him of his
railway saloon. This gave rise to the miserable Triple Alliance. At
last came the conflict with William, in which the mighty
one was vanquished, as Napoleon was vanquished by Alexander.
Political life-and-death unions only prosper if founded on a constitutional
basis and not on an international one. They are all
the more questionable if the partner is feeble. Bismarck never meant
the Alliance to take this form.
He always treated the English with forbearance; he knew that this was
wiser. He always paid marked respect to the old
Queen Victoria, despite his hatred of her daughter and of political
Anglomania; the learned Beaconsfield and the
worldly-wise Salisbury he courted; and even that strange Gladstone,
whom he did not like, really had nothing to complain
about.
The Ultimatum to Serbia was the culminating point of the policy of the
Berlin Congress, the Bosnian crisis, the Conference of
London: but there was yet time to turn back.
We were completely successful in achieving that which above all other
things should have been avoided the breach with
Russia and England.
Our Future
After two years' fighting it is obvious that we dare not hope for an
unconditional victory over the Russians, English, French,
Italians, Rumanians, and Americans, or reckon on being able to wear
our enemies down. But we can obtain a peace by
compromise only by evacuating the occupied territory, the retention
of which would in any event be a burden and cause of
weakness to us, and would involve the menace of further wars. Therefore
everything should be avoided which would make it
more difficult for those enemy groups who might possibly still be won
over to the idea of a peace by compromise to come to
terms, viz., the British Radicals and the Russian Reactionaries. From
this point of view alone the Polish scheme is to be
condemned, as is also any infringement of Belgian rights, or the execution
of British citizens to say nothing of the insane
U-boat plan.
"Our future lies on the water." Quite right; therefore it is not in
Poland and Belgium, in France and Serbia. This is a return to
the days of the Holy Roman Empire and the mistakes of the Hohenstaufens
and Habsburgs. It is the policy of the Plantagenets,
not that of Drake and Raleigh, Nelson and Rhodes. The policy of the
Triple Alliance is a return to the past, a turning aside
from the future, from imperialism and a world policy. "Middle Europe"
belongs to the Middle Ages, Berlin-Bagdad is a
blind alley and not the way into the open country, to unlimited possibilities,
to the world mission of the German nation.
I am no enemy of Austria, or Hungary, or Italy, or Serbia, or any other
state, but only of the Triple Alliance policy, which
was bound to divert us from our aims and bring us onto the inclined
plane of a Continental policy. It was not the German
policy, but that of the Austrian Imperial House. The Austrians had
come to regard the Alliance as an umbrella under the
shelter of which they could make excursions to the Near East when they
thought fit.
And what must we expect as the result of this war of nations? The United
States of Africa will be British, like those of
America, Australia and Oceania. And the Latin states of Europe, as
I predicted years ago, will enter into the same relations
with the United Kingdom that their Latin sisters in America maintain
with the United States. The Anglo-Saxon will dominate
them. France. exhausted by the war, will only attach herself still
more closely to Great Britain. Nor will Spain continue to
resist for long.
And in Asia the Russians and the Japanese will spread and will carry
their customs with their frontiers, and the South will
remain to the British.
The world will belong to the Anglo-Saxons, Russian and Japanese, and
the German will remain alone with Austria and
Hungary. His rule will be that of thought and of commerce, not that
of the bureaucrat and the soldier. He made his appearance
too late, and hi last chance of making good the past, that of founding
a Colonial Empire, was annihilated by the world-war.
For we shall not supplant the sons of Ichwe. Then will be realised the
plan of the great Rhodes, who saw the salvation of
humanity in the expansion of Britondotm in British Imperialism.
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento.
Hae tibi erunt artes: pacisque imponere morem,
Parcere subjectis et debellare superbos
Created: 4 August 1996, 06:03 AM Last Updated: 4 August 1996, 06:03
AM
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