When Karl's mother died in 1811, he and his two sisters found a
          home in the household of the Archduke Karl. Little is known about his
          youth, but the strict military atmosphere of the Archduke's household
          and the influence of his father would have been decisive for the
          development of his character. In 1828 when he was just twenty he
          entered the army. He was almost twenty-three when he married, 16 May
          1831, Countess Caroline von Trauttmansdorff-Weinsberg. Subsequently
          they produced five children.
             He began his military career as a Subaltern in the 3rd regiment of
          Ulans of the Archduke Karl. On 16 February 1829 he was promoted to
          full Lieutenant with the 10th regiment of Hussars. On 2 July 1838 he
          became a Captain of Cavalry and was transferred to the 1st regiment of
          Ulans and attached to the Archduke Albrecht in the autumn of 1839 for
          the latter's journey to Russia. Archduke Albrecht wrote to Karl's
          father about the close friendship that had developed between him and
          young Karl. Karl also wrote from Moscow full of enthusiasm for the
          Archduke. In December 1842 Karl was made Lieutenant-Colonel in the 7th
          Cheveauxlegers regiment. On 23 December 1843 he was made Colonel in
          the 2nd regiment of Hussars. At this time he left the Army  to enter
          the service of the Court.
             He was appointed Head Chamberlain to the Archduke Stephen, the
          Governor of Bohemia. When the Archduke succeeded his father to become
          Palatine of Hungary in 1847, Karl Grunne followed him as his Head
          Chamberlain. He was soon to meet his future Lord and Emperor. The
          Emperor Ferdinand appointed the young Archduke Franz to represent him
          at the installation of the new Palatine in Pressburg on 12 November
          1847. There was general enthusiasm among those present over the
          address by the Archduke, delivered in perfect Hungarian.
             Soon Grunne, out of his loyalty to the Emperor, could no longer
          agree with the political position taken by the Palatine. He left the
          service of the Archduke as the latter fell ever more under the
          influence of the Hungarian radicals. However, the personal good
          relations between Gr?nne and the Archduke remained unimpaired. In June
          1848, aged 39, Grunne became Head Chamberlain to the 18 year-old
          Archduke Franz. Although far from a position of power at Court, Grunne
          from the outset showed qualities of energy, tact, thoroughness and
          initiative which made him an ideal mediator in a number of difficult
          situations and quickly won him the confidence of the entire royal
          household.
             As an early assignment he was sent in September 1848 to mediate
          on behalf of the Court between the Archduke Stephen and Fieldmarshal
          Jellachich, the Ban of Croatia. Jellachich had been ordered to put
          down the movement for independence in Hungary, led by Kossuth and the
          Revolutionary Party. The Archduke was in a difficult situation for, as
          Palatine, he was Head of Government of a country under threat from the
          Emperor's senior Fieldmarshal. He sought the support from the Emperor
          for his position and requested that Jellachich be ordered to halt his
          advance. Both sides consulted Grunne, who supported Jellachich, but
          achieved an outcome which, while suppressing the revolt, was lenient
          to the Hungarians to ease their return to the fold. Grunne was next
          involved on behalf of the Court in negotiations to put an end to the
          October 1848 uprising in Vienna. Although not actively involved in the
          early stages of the 'conspiracy' to replace the Emperor Ferdinand with
          his young nephew, the Archduke Franz, Grunne became a key figure in
          the final preparations. He drafted all the key documents and
          proclamations. As some of these were signed merely 'Franz', they were
          not issued until after it had been decided to add 'Joseph' to the
          young Emperor's name; consequently these documents had to be signed
          again by him.
             In April 1849 Grunne became deeply involved in Franz Joseph's
          decision to recall Fieldmarshal Prince Windisch-Graetz from command of
          the forces charged with putting down the revolution in Hungary. His
          contacts among the Hungarian nobility, within the Austrian Army and
          even among Windisch-Graetz's own officers, all urged him to intervene
          with the Emperor on the basis that the Fieldmarshal had lost the
          initiative and the situation was in an unstable stalemate.
          Windisch-Graetz was unaware of Grunne's role and remained on friendly
          terms with him. However, Windisch-Graetz was clearly hurt by his
          recall after decades of loyal service to the Crown, culminating in his
          key role in the accession of the young Emperor. It became Grunne's
          task over some years to mollify the old soldier's feelings while
          protecting the Emperor from the avalanche of advice and admonition
          emanating from Windisch-Graetz.
             In April and May 1849 Grunne was deeply involved in the decision to
          seek Russian help in suppressing the uprising in Hungary. In this he
          effectively countered the advice of Minister-President Prince
          Schwarzenberg (the brother-in-law of Windisch-Graetz) against Russian
          intervention. Grunne's intervention was unsuccessful in one tragic
          event of the Hungarian campaign. Fieldmarshal Haynau,
          Windisch-Graetz's replacement, believed he had the authority to hand
          out to the Hungarian insurgents what punishment he saw fit, including
          the death penalty. He was determined to hang the thirteen Hungarian
          Generals who had led the uprising. Following a number of interventions
          to Franz Joseph on behalf of these men, pleading for their lives,
          Grunne was sent to Haynau to delay at least the executions until their
          cases could be reviewed. However, Haynau had bypassed Gr?nne's orders
          and carried out the executions. Although his intercession had failed,
          Hungary remained grateful to Gr?nne for his efforts and made him an
          honorary citizen of Arad where the executions had been carried out.
          The accession of the young Franz Joseph began with ten years of
          Absolutist rule over the Empire in sharp reaction to the upheaval of
          the revolutions in Vienna, Prague and Budapest. From the outset of his
          reign, Franz Joseph knew his own mind, and took advice only to the
          extent of its being consistent with the broad thrusts of his policies.
          His first step, with his decree of 30 April 1849, was to take overall
          command of his Army. This meant that all troop movements had to be
          cleared with him, as had all promotions above staff-officer and the
          disposition of all war materials. To give effect to this he created a
          Military Central Chancellery and appointed Gr?nne its first head as
          his Adjutant-General and First Adjutant-General of the Army. Grunne
          was then forty.
             During the early 1850's the Army was significantly reorganised
          under Grunne. The lines of command and responsibility were streamlined
          both within the Army and between it and the Minister for War. The
          Ministry was wound up and the Minister's responsibility considerably
          reduced. The Military Central Chancellery dealt with all military
          strategic issues, including all matters referred to it by the Emperor,
          and oversighted Army-conditions of service. All decisions, rules and
          orders were promulgated by the First Adjutant-General "On Highest
          Authority". No action could be carried out without his signature and
          only he had the right to sign in the Emperor's name.
             The reorganisation of the Army was only partly carried through, as
          it was significantly impeded by the large troop reductions of 1853,
          1855 and 1858 which, despite Grunne's objections, were pushed through
          to relieve the parlous state of the Austrian economy. Therefor the
          Army's problems of organisation could not be resolved as quickly as
          the Emperor and Gr?nne had wished. Discontent over the reforms,
          especially over the lengthened period of service, focused on Grunne,
          though much had been done in his name by others.
             It is certain that, in his key position, Grunne had the closest
          insight into all military (and political) matters. It might have been
          expected that he would have exercised extraordinary power,but
          paradoxically this was never to be the case. This can only be
          understood in terms of the very strong, direct exercise of power by
          the young Emperor, and Grunne's relationship with him. Karl Grunne
          became the Emperor's Adjutant-General because there was no-one in the
          immediate circle of Franz Joseph and his family, in the traumatic
          times leading to his succession, who was more trusted. As well, their
          views and approaches were very similar. Franz Joseph used Grunne as a
          counterweight to his liberal Ministers, whose philosophical stance he
          largely did not share.
              Theirs was a strong friendship to be unmatched again between the
          Emperor and one of his subjects. Grunne genuinely admired the Emperor
          and loved him like a son. The Emperor would visit him almost daily
          and discussed the most crucial matters of State with him. Hence Grunne
          was mentor to Franz Joseph in the key formative stage of his long
          reign, and the Emperor was to show extraordinary loyalty to him
          throughout his life.
              Contrary to the account of many histories of this time, it is a
          fact that Grunne also enjoyed a close friendship with the Empress
          Elisabeth, forged at the outset by their mutual love of riding and
          horses. He became her mentor and confidant as well as the Emperor's.
          Until about 1862 many letters from Elisabeth still in Dobersberg
          testify to the genuine warmth between them. As Elisabeth withdrew
          increasingly from the Emperor and the Court, Grunne found himself
          drawn even more into his familiar role of mediator. He was sent by the
          Emperor to her in Corfu in June 1861 as his emissary. The cause of the
          final rift between Grunne and the Empress is not known, but probably
          stemmed from a crucial intercession by him on the Emperor's behalf, or
          at least some decisive move by him to side with the Emperor. As
          Elisabeth had confided in Grunne, she may well have felt betrayed.
          After the sudden death of Karl Schwarzenberg in April 1852, Franz
          Joseph decided not to replace him as Minister-President and he himself
          took on the primary role in Cabinet. Schwarzenberg's death was a
          tragic loss with long term consequences, as his powerful personality
          was no longer there to keep the other Ministers in check and to guide
          the young Emperor. Grunne's poor relationships with Franz Joseph's
          ministers are well documented; they were jealous of his close
          relationship with the Emperor which led to the rejection of many of
          their proposals.
              As the Crimean crisis unfolded in 1854, Grunne strongly favoured
          retaining the Monarchy's friendship with Russia. Like all Austrian
          conservatives, he saw Russia as the last conservative power to which
          the Monarchy could turn in the battle against the drive for
          independence by the various nationalities. In this he found himself
          out of step with Franz Joseph, who began to turn increasingly against
          Russia under the influence of the liberal ministers, Bach and Buol.
          They alienated Russia without satisfying the Western powers. This set
          the climate for the final disaster of the Absolutist phase of Franz
          Joseph's reign, the Italian campaign of 1859.
              Quoting his evidence of the advanced preparations of the Sardinian
          and French armies, Grunne argued strongly and repeatedly between
          January and March 1859 for a major build-up of the Austrian Second
          Army stationed in Italy. He was strenuously opposed by Buol who
          rejected the prospect that France would intervene for Sardinia, and by
          Bach who argued that the economy could not cope with the cost of a
          troop build-up. The Emperor sided with them.
              A remarkable turnabout occurred at the Ministerial Conference of 6
          April 1859. The ministers who had consistently resisted all proposals
          for expansion of the army now argued that the right strategic moment
          was at hand for delivery of an Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia. Its
          expected rejection would create the circumstance for Austria to defeat
          Piedmont quickly before the French could intervene on its behalf.
          Grunne saw the greatest danger for Austria from such a move, given the
          relative lack of preparedness of the Austrian army in Italy, and
          argued strenuously against such a step until a build-up of that Army
          had been completed. The Emperor decided that the ultimatum should be
          sent to Sardinia, but that a troop build-up should only be approved if
          France declared for Piedmont.
              Grunne showed understandable reluctance to take responsibility for
          finding a military solution to what he saw as a foreign policy
          disaster which would leave Austria completely isolated and militarily
          unprepared. The ultimatum had been sent at the worst possible moment.
          If the Emperor had taken his advice the later catastrophe of the
          defeat of Magenta might have been averted.
              Grunne has been blamed for the choice of Gyulai to lead the
          Austrian forces. His appointment as Commander in Chief in Italy, to
          replace Radetzky following his retirement, had occurred in 1857; and
          his credentials, in an Army which had not fought a major conflict for
          many years, had seemed excellent. However he was patently inadequate
          for the task. Recognising this himself, he pleaded with the Emperor to
          appoint a senior commander over him. However, this was not done. In
          hindsight it should have been, though it is far from clear with whom.
               After the slaughter of Magenta on 17 June 1859, the Emperor himself
          took command of the First and Second Armies. Given his complete
          inexperience in the leadership of large forces in battle, this did
          nothing to counter the succession of tactical blunders which
          culminated in the defeat at Solferino later that month. Although
          Grunne accompanied the Emperor, he neither sought, nor had any
          significant influence upon the conduct of the campaign. He recognised
          that his strengths were not those of a Chief-of-Staff, and did not
          attempt to influence operational issues.
              The events of 1859 are fully documented in the histories of the
          Monarchy. They marked the end of the Absolutist phase of Franz
          Joseph's rule. The demand for change was overwhelming and to his great
          credit he embraced it. At the news of the surrender at Solferino, the
          public demand for Grunne's dismissal was intense. Grunne himself
          pleaded to be released but the Emperor refused. Grunne continued at
          his post until October when he again requested release from his
          position. This time Franz Joseph reluctantly agreed but appointed him
          his Master of the Horse and awarded him the Grand Cross of the Order
          of St. Stephen. At this point Karl Grunne left the stage of Austrian
          history, though without losing the favour of his Monarch. In 1864 he
          was appointed General of Cavalry. In 1865 he became patron of the 1st
          Regiment of Ulans and was awarded the Order of the Golden Fleece.
          Until his death Grunne managed the Emperor's private finances and,
          until 1871, administered the Emperor's private properties of Prater
          and Krieau. In 1875 he requested the Emperor's permission to retire.
          He lived the rest of his life with his family at Dobersberg but spent
          long periods at Baden when his health failed. The Emperor visited him
          there several times. He died in Baden on 15 June 1884.
 

Source: Leo van de Pas